Peace talks aim to find an end to conflict. Yet, despite the often painful compromises needed to reach an agreement, talks are rarely successful in ending violence. The fact that peace agreements do not necessarily result in lasting peace has led to a reappraisal of the peace process and its outcomes. The capacity of an agreement to solve information asymmetry and commitment problems, enable indivisibility, address structural causes of conflict and enable power sharing are among the key issues examined (Fortna 2004; Mattes and Savun 2009; Joshi and Darby 2013).
In addition, negotiations often face obstacles beyond the parties themselves. Some of these include spoilers, third-party actors and the broader political context. This article uses case examinations of peace processes in Colombia and Turkey to explore the ways these factors affect the outcome of the talks.
The analysis begins with a comparison of the negotiation frameworks in these two cases. The Colombian government legislated guidelines for negotiating with the FARC, providing transparency and legitimacy to the process; in contrast, the Turkish government excluded civil society participants, and lacked legal guarantees and a mechanism for managing information. The Colombian approach was able to address a number of these challenges and ultimately produced a durable peace agreement, while the Turkey’s collapsed in mid-2015.
In both cases, the potential for spoilers was high. In Colombia, the FARC’s splinter factions could threaten the integrity of the negotiation, while in Turkey, disgruntled military members, ultranationalist groups and Gulenists threatened to undermine the process. However, the ability of these armed actors to undermine the talks was relatively limited.
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